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Im1tcmtJCTION 
Following  the  Intense  legislative  activity  required  In  order  to estnbllsh  the  Internal  market, 
the Community  is  now  focusing  on the effective operation of the common rules  Introduced. 
!n particular  1  it  needs  to enaure  thstt  Directives are correctly  Incorporated  lmo national  law 
and,  more generally 1  that Community measures are effectively  Implemented,  'thlm  Involves, 
among  o(her  things,  deploying  appropriate  human  and  material  resour~i\~,.  ;:xpandlng 
administrative  cooperatlor.  between  the  various  bodies  responsible  for  Implementing  the 
common  rules,  and  providing  natural  and  legal  penom  who  suffer  harm  as  a result  of 
breache!l of Internal market  rules with acce!l!l  to cffecllvc  mean.~! of redress. 
As  regard!!  the  last  area  mentioned,  In  ii!!  communication  to  the Council  entitled  "Making 
the  most  of  the  lntcrn11l  Markel:  St:~:tglc  progrnmrne•  (COM(93)  632  Onal  of 
22 December  1993)  the  Commill!llon  !llreucd  the  need  to  Improve  the  tramparenc::y  of 
n.Jllonal  arrnflgcmcnts  for  hn~)~lng  pcnalllc!l  In  the  event  of  non-compliance  with 
requirements deriving  from  the common rulc!i. 
Section  0.111  of  the  5tratcglc  programme  ("RedteJI':  Accc!!l  to  jmtlcc:  and  judicial 
cooperation·) cxprcs!lly  providcfl  fur  the Cnrnrnil'!llon tn  rttornrncnd: 
•  impro11lng  the  trarup:ucncy  of  national  !lanctlom  by  requiring  that  they  be 
systcrnRtlc~lly  notHlcd  (hy  the  Mcrnlocr Statc!ll  with  tran!lposltlon  measures; 
approrrlatc  prov!!lion.~ will  he  written  into future  lcgl!llaclvc  propmal!l  in the  Internal 
Market  ~trca  and  Member  State~  will  he  uked  to  cmnmunlcJtlc  Information  In 
relation  to existing  legl!llntion. • 
Since  the  cffcctlvenc!l!l  of  penalties  foml.s  an  Integral  part  of the  overall  machinery  for 
ensuring that  the  Internal-market  rules  nrc  lrnplernentcd,  the  purpose of this  communie~tlon 
Is  to  Inform  the  Council  and  the  European l'arllamcnt  of the  Commls!llon's  rca!lonlng  and 
?lam with  regard  to  this particular aspect of the  Slratcgic  programme.  This communication 
con.~tltutes Initial  guidelines  In a more comprehemlve framework  for diM:usslom. 
Article  S  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  Eur'lpean  Cofitmunlty  stlpulat~s  that: 
"M,mber States  shall  take  all  appropriate  measure!!,  whether  general  or  particular  1  to 
ensure fulfilment of the ob:lgatlons arising out of this Treaty or resulting  from  action taken 
by the Institutions of the Community." The  Court  or Justice  has  ruled  that,  where  Community  legl8latlon  does  not  tpeclflcally 
provide  any  penalty  for  an  Infringement  or  refers  for  that  purpo8c  to  natlor1al  iawa, 
regulations  and  administrative  provisions,  Article  ~  of  the  Treaty  requires  tho 
Member States to tako all  measure11  ncceuary to guarantee the application and effectlvenetll 
of Commutllty  law,  In  particular by  making  the penalty chosen effective,  proportionate and 
dissuasive.' 
As  In  any  legal  system,  It  !s  lmp,,rtant  to  deter  tho~~e  bound  by  Community  law  from 
neglectlr•g their obllgatlonA and to ensure that any  Infringement Is duly penalized. 
Accordingly,  only a comlstent approach  to  the  quefitlon of perudtle11  in  the  Internal-market 
context  Is  capable  or cn!lurlng  both  fair  competition  under  fair  trading  conditions  and  the 
protection or those R!pects of the general good covered by common rules. 
Ensuring CaJr tOJDP£t11lon uodc&:.ltdt f[adlog wnd.ltJou 
Since  compliance  with  Internal-market  legl!llatlon  lmpme!l  direct  or  Indirect  co!lts  on 
buslnc!II'C!I,  the  potential  hcncOt!l  of  non-cnrnpllancc  (short·tcrm  pront  or  cvulon  of 
common  rc!ltrktbr~)  ~hould  not  nutwci~th  the  pertalties  incurred  •  all  111  the  ca~.  for 
example,  if pcnallie.' arc lrulgnincant or only  hyroc>4hetk:al. 
In  some  ca~s.  the  condition~ of  fair  comrctlllon  would  he  undermined  or  harmed  by 
deOclcnt  national  rules  on  penaltk:J.  Thl~ could  alw  lead,  In  certain  cin:umAtances,  to 
dllltortlon.'l  of competition  prcjuc.Jic:ial  lo  the  free  movcrnenc  of goods  and  JCrvlces  In  the 
Community • wme~hlng whk:h  I~ tofally uruteccrtahlc  in the  internal  m~rket. 
Yet  the  Importance  of  cnllurlng  cornpllance  with  lnternaJ.markcr  legislation  extcnd11  far 
beyond  the  economic  ls~UC!I relaling  to  the  free  rnovemenl  uf person.11,  goods,  ~rvices and 
capital. 
In  particular.  the  Internal-market  rules  require  the  attainment  of a high  level  of protection 
with regard to health, safety,  the  cnvlro11111Cnt  nnd con.11umcrs. 
See,  In  particular, paragraph I 23  and 24 of the judgment  In  Case 68/88 CnmmlnfoH v OrE!t!ce  [ 1989) 
P.CR 2965, The  ab1enco of effective,  proportionate  and  dissuasive  penalties  for  lnfrlnglna  Community 
law  would,  therefore,  damage  the  very  credibility  of common  Jesl•latlon  by expo1lngthe 
Union'• citizens  and  their environment to  rl11k1t  that  nrc  unacceptable  to  the  Individual  and 
to 1oolety as  11  whole, 
U.  THE LIMITS OUEFEWL m  NATimJAL SY8TIM/l.Oi: PINALTJU 
Under Community law,  Implicit referral • via straightforward application of Article '  of the 
Treaty  • or  explicit  referral  to  national  systems  of  penalties  Is  regarded  as  the  norm, 
whereu dcnnlng  common  penalties  remains  the  exception,  1rhl!1  general  state  or affairs  Is 
fully  In accordance with the subsidiarity principle. 
The  Comrnunlty'~ legislative  activity  In  the  Internal-market  field  111  based  on  need  and 
proportionality. 
However,  such  A pmltlon  1!1  polltkJtlly  and  ~ocially  tenable  only  If  national  llystcm.'l  of 
penalties  and  the  way  in  which  they  are  appHtd  do  not  jcopardlte  the  dfcctlvcncu, 
proportionality  n;KJ  db!luuivcne~s of the penalties  In question. 
Consequently,  the  c"i~lencc of different  national  'Y'Illcnt.~ of pcnallit'!l  11  compaciblc  with  lhc 
proper  functicming  of the  Internal  market  only  If  tl«~ char-.ctcri•Hc~ Are  re'pectcd  by  all 
concerned,  If IJCCd  be  vh•  ad1ptackm of ltlm-C national  ~y,tcrnt. 
It  follows  from  1~ cuc·IAw of the  Cour1 of  lu.~Ucc that.  where Community  le(ll1.1lation doc'l 
not  spcclncally  provide  any  penalty  for  1n  infrlnatcmcnr  or  refcn  for  rhat  pu~  to 
national  laws.  regulation.•  1f1d  administrative  provldom,  rhe  Member Stites,  while 
remaining  free  In  their  choke of penaltie!',  mu!CI  cn!lure  In  ~articular that  Infringements of 
Community  law are  penaiiT.Cd  under condltk""· borh  P~"''"':'>~-'  -.·~~  ;~nd substa!'ltlve,  which are 
a111logous  to  tho~ applicable  to  lnfrlngcmcntJI  nf  nt.  ··<:  ~r./1  of  a similar  rtalurc  and 
Importance  and  • the  Court  adds  ·  •wttkh,  In  •Ol. ,  c::.~~:::  .nake  the  pe111lty  effective, 
proportionate and dluuallivc•. 1 
Accordingly  I  where  the  errectlvcnell!l,  proportionality  and  di!l.llUI!IiVeness  of  the  penalty 
would  n<:·t  be  guaranked  by  applying  an  existing  national  sy!ltcm  of  pc111ltles,  (he 
Member State concerned  must either choose another system of penaltlc!l  that  satlsne11  those 
crlcerla,  adar•  Its  existing  system  or  Introduce  a  11peclal  system  In  order  to  meet  the 
requirements deriving from Article '  of the Treaty. 
Acco -,<Jfng  to the  well~stabllehed clise·law or the Court of Justice, a Member State may  not 
p1eart  t·t~vlslons, practices or circumstances existing in  ltg  lnterna11ega1 system In order to 
--·------- 2  Set~ paraaraph 24 of the Judgm•nt referred to In footnote  I, 
3 I' 
justify  apt)lyhtg  a natlcma1  system  of penalties  that  does  not  comply  with  itt  obttptlom 
under Community law. 3  · 
There  Is  no apparent reason to believe that,  where a Member State determines the peruddes 
relating to the Community or national rules applicable, those penalties will  not be effective, 
proportionate  and  dissua11lve,  since  It  is  In  that  country's  Interest  as  a State  baled  on  the 
rule  of  law  ..  in  terms  of  the  confidence  both  of  lUI  own  nat'  11lls  and  of  the  other 
Member States  of  the  Union  ..  to  eruiUre  that  the  rules  appllc..::·:~  on  its  territory  are 
effectively enforced. 
Nevertheless, given the • In some cases • slgnlncant differences noted by the Commission In 
the  course of a!lseulng  the  transposal  and  application or the  common  rules,  It  Is  Important 
to  emaure  that  national  systems  of  penalties  are  sufl1clently  transparent  for  their 
effectiveness, proportionality and dlsswnlveness robe connrmed. 
The  Internal  market  compri&cs  an  are11  without  Internal  frontlcrt  within  whk:h  goods. 
person.~.  service~ and  capital  an:  able  to  move  freely  In  accordance  wUh  the  provlslom of 
the  Treaty.  Community  lntc:rnaJ.rnarkct  legiJiatkm,  therefore,  covert  a diverwlty  of Oelds 
Including foodstuffs,  nnanc:lal  ~rvkc'\, rhe  recOJlnltion of dlpJonw,  meant of transport and 
communication, direct and  indirect taut  ion,  and  the  right of rakknco. It takes Into account 
the  need  lo  protect  Juch  Important  11pect.s  of  the  ,encral good  u  publk:  healeh  and  human 
life,  the  environment.  indumlal  11nd  cornrncrcial  rroperty.  the  falme!t.t  of  commerc:tal 
traMaetlom,  and C()NUrneu. 
However,  It  I~ not  nece!ltary  en  look  at  uch of these areal  In order to  under~tand the  llmitJ 
or referral  co  national  1ystemj  of pcnalllcJ.  Community  legltlation  on  public  procurcmef't 
provides  by  iL~tr an  e"amplc  that  ill  all  the  more  !llgnlfkant  bccau~ It  e"prculy requlrct 
Member Statell  to  provide  for  rcmedlen  and  to  Impose  certain  penalliet  If  the  rula 
applicable are breached. 
In  spite  of  thes~ speclnc  provl!!lons,  the  tran.t~pmal of the  directives  concerne~ Is  hardly 
,:atlsfactory  and  has  already  led  the  Commls!!lon  to  lruritule  Infringement  proceedlnp 
against several Member Stales. 
3 
4 
See, In particular, the judamem In Cate C.74/89 Comml11lon v /Jtlglum  (  1990] ncR 1·491 1 coonrmed 
'"'''alia by that In Cue C·217/81 Comm/11/on v Glfmany  (  1990] IU:It 1·2179, 
Council  Directive 89/66$/nec or 21  Dtetmber 1989 on tfte ebOfdlnatlcm  ctf the  law•~ reaulatlon• and 
admlnlttratlve prcwltlons retatlna to tfteappllcatlon or rfVIew procedure• to the award or public supply 
and  public work•  contrllctt,  1111d  Council  Directive 92/f 3/611C or 2~ Febrtl11ry I  992  coordinating tfte 
lawt, regulation• and admlnlttratfve prcwltlon• relatlna to tfte application or Comtnunlty  rule~ on  the 
procurement proetdutel of entitle• operlltlna  Itt  tfte water,  tt~eray, transpmt and  telecommunication• 
HCtOfl, 
4 ,,, 
-~  ' 
t' 
The Comml81lon
1t  reason~ for doing 10 Include  th~ following: 
the  review  body  Is  not  an  Independent  C(l1Jrt  or  tribunal  wJthln  the ·  meaning  of 
Article 177 of the nc Treaty; 
..  that  body  has  lnsumclent  powers  (In  certain  cases,  It  Is  unable  to  order  Interim 
measures or has dlfnculty  In doing so), or Its powers are confined to certain types of 
contract. 
Comequently,  nl'fM  do  not  always  have  access  co  effective  means  of  redress  when  they 
consider that their  lnteres~ have been hifrmed,  and the effecllvenes!J of the relevant national 
penalties Is weakened as a resulc. 
In  10me  Instances,  the  penaltle11'  proportionality  and  dlnuaslvenes1  can  likewise  be 
jeopardized:  comperwaclon  arrangement.~ are a  ca~e In point. 
The public  procurement directive• do  no( lay  down detailed  rulet  regarding  the  amount of 
compematlon. Consequently,  In  some  Member StateJ lr  is minimal, covering ·for example· 
only the costA incurred !r·  1~  cour~ of  ~ubmltrlng a bid, while  In ochen  lc coven the nrm's 
loss  of earnlngJ  0 .  ~.  .,•  proli«  that  rh.:  nrm  would  have  made  had  It  been  awarded  the 
contract). 
Olven the ecoMmk i:nport.ar.rc: of each contract covered hy lhc dlrecliveJ (more chin ECU 
200 000 for eacti •upply  conch~«. and more than  r~cu S mllllon for each workJ contracl),  It 
can  hardly  be  dl~r:·~"!d char  the  JIJ,illfk:a:  .. tl  difference  In  compc:mafion amngement!l affectJ 
how awarding aufi;;..'; \tk:J and  firm.t  \· .  .etu.ve. 
Thl.!l Aituadon can somclimes create  dl~tortlom In compc1ltion,  thereby Jcot.tardlling the free 
movement of the good' and .ervlce1 concerned within rhe Internal market. 
That  1.!1  why.  In addttion to examining  national  legltlacton,  the  CommiJ..4ion  i1  auempflng to 
astc.!lt  tllelr  aciUII  lmplementadon.  Accordingly.  an  analydcal  grid  hu been  proposed 
within the framework or too Advtwry Commiuee for Public Procurement. bur  ll hu not yet 
been  pmtlble  to  perfect  the  grid  owing  co  inexplk:able  diffic:utriet  e"perlenced  by  the 
national authoritlet In  traru~mlttlng the  relcwant data. 
111,  Lf.MONI AHD CONCLUIJ.O.NS 
A CommunltJ iuue 
Jn  public  procurement,  as  in  the  other  area•  of  the  Internal  market,  the  eff'e4:tive 
implementation of Community leglt1ation depends on several indiJSolubly linked factort. --- -----------------------------
r' 
TM  ef't'ectlvenets,  proportionality  and  dissuasivene88  of  the  penaltfe•  for  breaching 
Community  taw~·  In the  f1rst  place,  on  the  com.rnon rule.  belns  trans~  and/or 
hnplemonted  correctly  and  effectively,  and  on  sound  administrative  cooperatiM  which  It 
itself based on transparency, 
ln Itt communication  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Partlament on  the  development  of 
admlnittratlve cooperation In the Implementation and enforcement of Community lesl•lation 
In  the  Internal  market  (COM(94)  29  nnal  of 16 Pebruuy 1994),  the  Commi11Jon stressed 
that  Un~Wen or Incomplete application of Community  ~aw would  not only reduce the OYerall 
benefits  of the  Internal  market  and  a«ect  the  tnterettJ  of  the  citlt.em  or  enterprise• 
concerned  but  alto  jeopardlt.e  the  mutual  conl1dence  which  underlies  the  whole 
lnternal·markec structure._' 
In  lcs  retolutlon  on  che  same  subject,  che  Council  ir.selr  noced  dt.ll  iC  is  essential  for  chf; 
proper  functioning  of  lhe  Community  co  lncrea.4C  mutual  confidence  and  (ransparency 
between  admlnltcraclom  and  thereby  ensure  chat  Community  legislation  It  enforced 
effectively, ef'fklencly and uniformly  In all  Member Scates.' 
The  pena!tle!l  luue It  not.  therefore.  one  whk:h  it purely  nat.,_l In  scope  and  which c•n 
be viewed separately rrom chc general  problem..~ nsoclalcd with  the operation of the  Internal 
marker. 
Neverthelel'~.  as  explained  atxwe,  both  the  Kopc  of  tnccrnal·markd  legislation  and  the 
llpe<:lfk  nature  or the  :uca•  It  coven  nece~~itale a pn~matlc and  -'«total apprOKh  to  the 
question of penalties. 
In  some  cases  custodial  penalrte~  may  be  neceuary  (u  In  ~~ supprc:J!Iion  of  the 
money-Jaunderlng  operarloru  addreued  by  fJirecclve  9J /308/EOC"),  while  In  others  civil 
liability  may  be  appropriate  (tuch at for  the  non-fulfilment  of obligations  under  concrac:cs 
concerning pacbge travel,  package holldayt and package tours as  provided  for  in Directive 
90/314/EEC") 
Th's  pragmaiJc,  sectoral  approach  ill  already  iltuscrated  In  other  areas  of  Community 
legislation, 1uch as the Common Agricultural Policy, ~  Common Fisheries Policy and the 
Common Traruport Policy (areu in which penalties often range from pecuniary sanctions to 
the withdrawal of a 
11llcence,, a "permit" or an "authorization"), or In the work  In progress 





See f'(Jinf t I (1( Anne" I ("tUde c;( pi.Y, to dtt communleadott. 
Council  resolution  of'  16 June 1994  on  tfte  ~efopmmt ar  admlnlttratlve  caopermlon  In  the 
lmpiMnentadon  and  enrorumeflt  a( Cotnmunlty  ftglstlflon  In  tf'lf  Internal  marl<et  (01  No  C I  79, 
1.7,1994, P•  1), 
Councfl  Dfrecd~e ctf 10 1une 1991  on ptl\lentlth J1 t~  UH of dtf flnancfaf  &y5fern  fC'Jf'  t~  purpme of' 
tnOMY fauft&lrfng, 01 Na L 166 , 28,6.91 p, '11 
CmmeU Dfrtetfvl ctf t:J 1une 1990 on J*bl'  tttvrJI, p8dctp hoffday1 and package court, OJ No L 
1!8, 2~.6,9\J p: $9 
6 .  --··--···-·-·-----------· 
The  ad~ent of the  Internal  market  has  highlighted  the  fact  that  Member States are Jofnt1y 
reSf10nslb1e  for  administering  the  common  eKternal  frontie~r  I  It wa1  thi•  comideration,  In 
particular, which led  the  Heads of Member Su.tes' Customs Admlnl•tratiOtll to decltte,  Jn 
their  Deumber  1993  1tatement concerning a framework  strategy  for  Cu1tomt  2000,  that 
,.our  N~lce•  wl11,  In cooperation with the Commission, eKamlne and report In  1994 on the 
range,  clat~lflcatlon and degree of serlousnest of customs Infractions  Ill  taking account of 
the pr«Wislont of the Community Customs Code,. I 
The  publle-proc:urement  f1ekJ  1!1  111  further  e"ample  which  clearly  dernonJCraces  chat  the 
possibility  of Introducing  common  penalties  or  sytcems  of  penalties  within  the  l~rnal 
market should not be  dl~mlssed out or hand. 
Only if the national systems of penalliet  for  non·fulnlmenc of obllpUons under Community 
law are transparent can the  CommiA~ion 
ensure that those national  Jy~tcm.• are  efrettl~e. proportionate and dissuasive, and 
thereby  c:onnne Community action  a.•  reJJrd.t  peruiHes  to  what  Is  strictly  neces~ary 
in order for  the internal market  co  function property  In each sector concerned. 
Transparency  alone  Is  the  key  co  mutu1l  confidence  and  an  indk:•tion of 1 comroon desire 
not to conceal any problenu. 
At the urne lime, tramparcncy  in no way prcjudgei any  ~:~eHon whk:h the Community might 
choote  co  take  in  individual  scccon  so  as  co  cncure  chic  the  lnkmal  market  functions 
properly, 
In  If~ role  u  guardian of the  Treacy.  che  Commit~  ion  I•  required  lo emure that  directives 
are  correccly  incorpormkd  into  Mtkmal  law  and.  more  generally,  char  Community  law  Is 
Implemented e«eccively and enklently . 
.  o\c:cordlngly,  the CommiJJion will  see co  It  duu,  from  now on,  me1sures  whoJe notification 
is  ~"pressly required by Community pr«Wisionl stipulate  the  relevant penalties.  As  JfJICed  In 
the  strategk:  programme  on  the  Internal  market,  appropriate  provisions  will  lnttr olio  be 
wrluen Into future proposals for directives or regulations relating to the  Internal market (tee 
examples of standard  ctw~s  given In the annex to this communlcaclon). 
However,  tramparency It also  c:a11et«  for  In administering the existing body of Community 
taw.  That  Is  why,  In  the  context  of monitoring  the  tramposat  and  Implementation  of 
Comrnunlty  taw,  Member Statet will  be catted on to  notify  ..  where  they  have  not  already 
done so" all relevant Information regarding their systems of penalties, and  re~arc:h will  be 
undertaken In the sectors requiring further work, 
7 W~re  necelfary, and within the lltt.ltl of itt power of initl:stive,  the CommJ••km wJJI tab 
measure•  and/or  make  proposals  with  a view  to  resolving  In  an  appropriate  manner  any 
seccoral problems that arise  In connection with penalties. Jr need be, those menure• and/or 
proposals  may  involve  the  .tttroduction  of common  penaltiefl  that  !ladffy  the  criflrl•  of 
ef'fecdveneSt, proportionality and dls!luasiveness required in order to implement Community 
lnternal  .. market legislation, 
Pradlcal mcaura for the CouncJI and the Member Stsda to calder 
When discussing the mentorarwlum from  the  French Presidency on penalties for breaches of 
Community law and  its effective implemencation  • the Council will hive the  oppotftlnicy to 
stress the political  Importance of thl!a  iJsue  for  the  proper functioning of the Community  in 
general, and the lnte·rnal  market  In particular. 
A clear and  firm  political commitment by the  ministers re.•pomible  for  the internal  market, 
supported by the  Hc:lld~ of Stare or Govrrnmenr of the  Member SCares  within the  F~ropean 
Council,  11hould  make  it  pc~sible fo  rally  supporr  among  the  narionll  authoricies for  mutual 
transparency  with rteprd  ro  pennlrlcs and shoukt enable  rhe Council and rhe  Member SCates 
co discuss openly and comrructively  rhc  ~oluriom which the Commistion will, if neustary, 
propme In rhi! area. 
Such  a  commitme!l'l1  would  be  in  line  wtch  lhe  decl.r-aHon  on  rhc  implementation  of 
Community Jaw  (N-o  19) annexed ro rhc final Kf of the Treaty on European Union 
By  meam  of  rhh1  communkalton.  rhe  Commis'ion  calls  on  the  Council  and  rhe 
European Pari lament: 
to rake  note of  il~ initial  guideline~ on  penalr~ in  rhe Internal Market  r~eld; 
eo confirm !he need  for  nalional §yslew of penaiHes  In  rhis area robe transparent; 
to  give  a  flrrn  commicmem  ro  suvpcn1ing  work  on  penalties,  parrk:ularly  in  the 
following sectors: public procurement, cusrom.• legislation; 
to  underralce  co  discun openly  and  constructively  the  ~ccoral proposals  which  the 
Commisalon will  be called upon to make during the coming months  in order lo ensure that 
penaltie8 for breaching the internal-market ruleg are effective, proportionate and  dissua~ive. £:~eampfa of ltandard c:hrusa that the Commfolml fnten4t Ul fnetu& 
In fu future  propo~alf for F.£  regulation~ smd dfte:tlfu 
The  following  examples,  which  are  purely  indicative,  in  no  way  prejudge the  appropriate 
prcwlsiom that the Commis~km  might wish to include in specfrtc or sectoral legislation, 
For regulatioM: 
"Member States  shall  lay  down  the  ~y~tem of penaltU!s  for  brt.aching  this  Regulation  and 
shall  take  all  the  measurej  necc~sary  to  eMure  that  those  penalties  are  applied,  The 
penalties thus  prcwidcd  for  shall  be effective,  proportionate  and dissuasive.  Member Sfatet 
1hall nocify the relevant prrwisiont to the Commistkm not Iacer thin ... and shall notify any 
sub!equem changes as~  u  possible.· 
For directives: 
"Member States shall lay down the  ~y~ccm of pcrutVraes  for  tlfeachlng tb.: national  ptO"Visiom 
adopced  puuuanc  ro  this Directive and  ~hall tJke  all  rhe  mcuura neeetury to ensure !hat 
fhme penalties are applied.  'l"hc penatlies thus provided for  shan  be  df~tdve, proportionate 
and  dissuasive.  Mflnber States  shall  notify  the  relevanc  provisions w f.he  Commission  not 
la!er than the date speci(led in Article  ... (dadline rm  rr.tns~J of rhe  Directive)  ~tnd sl'tall 
notify any  ~ubtequent chJnge-J ai  ~.1011 •~ ~~ihfe.  • 
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